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In an attempt to demonstrate that local hidden variables are mathemat-
ically possible, Pitowsky constructed “spin-1/2 functions” and later “Kol-
mogorovian models”, which employs a nonstandard notion of probability.
We describe Pitowsky’s analysis and argue (with the benefit of hindsight)
that his notion of hidden variables is in fact just super-determinism (and
accordingly physically not relevant).
Pitowsky’s first construction uses the Continuum Hypothesis. Farah and
Magidor took this as an indication that at some stage physics might give
arguments for or against adopting specific new axioms of set theory. We
would rather argue that it supports the opposing view, i.e., the widespread
intuition “if you need a non-measurable function, it is physically irrelevant”.
I. NO-GO THEOREMS
We briefly recall the notion on hidden variables and the two no-go theorems that will be relevant in this
paper: Bell’s theorem (Bell, 1964), the groundbreaking first proof that local hidden variables are impossible;
and the GHZ theorem (Greenberger et al., 1989). The GHZ theorem is simpler and stronger, as it shows
that local hidden variables cannot be consistently assigned to a single system (of three particles); whereas
Bell’s theorem shows that certain statistical frequencies cannot be reproduced by local hidden variables.
More details can be found in, e.g., (Mermin, 1993).
We will only consider systems of one, two or three spin-1/2 particles. σa denotes the spin observable in
direction a (with possible values ±1); if we are dealing with more than one particle, the observable for the
i-th particle is called σia. We will only investigate idealized Gedankenexperiments and do not care how they
could be implemented in reality.
A. Hidden variables, super-determinism
Local hidden variables
In quantum mechanics, a (pure) system is described by its state, a vector |Ψ〉 in some Hilbert space
H. For our purposes we can assume H to be finite dimensional, which somewhat simplifies notation. For
a given state and an observable A, the result of the measurement is generally not determined; we just get
probabilities for certain outcomes.
It is natural to ask whether there is a description of the system that provides deterministic predictions.
Let us call such a description “hidden variables”: A system in hidden variable state v has predetermined
results v(A) for all1 observables A. (In particular we require predictions for observables A, B which do not
commute; i.e., which cannot be measured simultaneously.)
∗ This paper is an extended version of my bachelor thesis at the University of Vienna, supervised by Caslav
Brukner. I would like to express my gratitude for his time and advice. Supported by Austrian Science Fund
(FWF): P23875 and P26737, and FWF Individual Project (No. 24621); Jakob.Kellner@TUWien.ac.at;
http://dmg.tuwien.ac.at/kellner/
1 or just: sufficiently many; finitely many is enough for our purposes
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2Once we perform a measurement for A (resulting in v(A)) then the system will change into a new hidden
variable state v′; and if we then perform a measurement for B we get the result v′(B). Generally there is
no reason to assume that v(B) = v′(B). Actually, it is obvious that for non-commuting observables, the
hidden variable has to change: Measuring first A, then B, and then A again will generally result in different
values for the two A measurements.
Let us call hidden variables non-contextual, if v(B) = v′(B) is satisfied for commuting observables A, B;
and local, if it is satisfied for spatially separated observables.2 In other words: if for a hidden variable state
we “simultaneously” measure such A, B we get the results v(A) and v(B).
It is widely accepted that the GHZ theorem (cf. Section I.B) shows that local hidden variables are im-
possible (assuming of course that quantum mechanical predictions are satisfied for all possible measurement
combinations).
Pitowsky claims his model is even non-contextual.
Statistical hidden variables
A hidden variable model for a given quantum mechanical state |Ψ〉 must predict the results that are
guaranteed by quantum mechanics.3 But more generally, it should also for other observables reproduce
the predicted frequencies (i.e., frequencies other than 100% or 0%). So we cannot assign the same hidden
variable to all systems in state |Ψ〉 (as there will be different results when measuring some A on different
copies of |Ψ〉.)
So it is natural to assume that a certain classical probabilistic mixture of different hidden variables
represents |Ψ〉, and that we can represent a sequence of systems in state |Ψ〉 by “randomly” (i.e., according
to the measure) picking hidden variables; and we require that the resulting frequencies are those predicted
by quantum mechanics.
More formally, we can require the following:
Assumption 1.1. ρ is a probability measure on the set of hidden variables. For all observables A (that
we consider), ρ({v : v(A) = a}) has to be equal to the quantum mechanical probability to get result a when
measuring A.
(In Pitowsky’s model, a weaker notion ρ will be used instead of the classical probability measure.)
It is widely accepted that Bell’s theorem (cf. Section I.C) shows that local statistical hidden variables
are impossible.
Non-local statistical hidden variables are possible: A very simple toy model (albeit with rather weird and
unpleasant properties) is given by Kochen and Specker (1967); a more serious theory is by Bohm (1952a,b).
Super-determinism
Let us define as super-determinism the statement:
All future phenomena are determined by the present state (not just the measurement results,
but also the question which measurements are performed).
While this position might be philosophically reasonable or satisfying, it is useless for physics: It is clear
that there cannot ever be a feasible “universal theory” that predicts which measurements will be performed.
(We can make the measurements, i.e., the setting of some detector, depend on the arrival of photons from
distance galaxies, etc.)
From a super-deterministic point of view, hidden variables are irrelevant but possible: we know which
measurements will be performed, and we can (but it makes little sense to do so) assign any values we like to
2 Note that non-contextual implies local, as spatially separated observables have to commute (to prevent
superluminal communication).
3 I.e.: If |Ψ〉 is eigenvector of A with eigenvalue a, the we require v(A) = a. Note that the GHZ theorem
shows that not even that can be done with local hidden variables.
3FIG. 1 The GHZ pentagram.
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other measurements, and there is no reason to assume that these bogus values should satisfy any quantum
mechanical prediction.
Of course we can never prove that there are no hidden variables of this “perverted” kind, as we cannot
(for obvious reasons) disprove super-determinism.
Non-super-deterministic hidden variables should have the property that they predict reasonable outcomes
(i.e., outcomes compatible with quantum mechanics) for all possible measurements (and not just for some
measurements that specifically fit the hidden variable). I.e., the hidden variable should not determine or
restrict which measurement we are allowed to perform.
B. The Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) theorem
Consider a system of three spin-1/2 particles, and the operators listed in Figure 1. For each of the four
lines Ê to Í, the operators in the line commute and have product +1. Also, the four operators in the
horizontal line commute and have product −1. We cannot assign real numbers v(A) to the operators while
satisfying these five requirements.4 (To see this, note that each node appears in exactly two lines. So the
product over the “line products”, which is 14 · (−1) = −1, has to be the product of all v(A) squared, a
contradiction.)
We now prepare the system in a simultaneous eigenstate (the so-called GHZ state) for the operators in
the horizontal line, with eigenvalue −1 for σ1xσ2yσ3y and +1 for the rest. For each of the lines Ê to Í, call the
product of the three remaining (single spin) operators the “reduced product”. E.g., the the reduced product
of Ê is the product of σ1x, σ
2
y and σ
3
y. So for the GHZ state, quantum mechanics predicts the value −1 for
the reduced product of Ê, and +1 for Ë–Í.
Also, the single spin operators are “spatially separated”, in the following sense: We can choose which
line from Ê to Í we measure by choosing directions (x or y) for each particle. For example, xyy results in
Ê and yyx in Ë. So if we assume that v is a local hidden variable, the result of measuring σ2y will be v(σ
2
y),
irrespective of whether we also measure σ1y and σ
3
x (i.e., we measure along Ë) or whether we measure σ
1
x
and σ3y (according to Ê).
Therefore, any local hidden variable will violate the quantum mechanically predicted value for the reduced
product of at least one of the lines Ê to Í.
For later reference, let us rephrase this result using projection operators:
4 The “requirement corresponding to Ë” is v(σ1y) · v(σ1yσ2yσ3x) · v(σ3x) · v(σ2y) = 1, etc.
4Fact 1.2. We cannot assign “yes” or ”no” to the six tests “Is σia = +1?” such that all four of the following
requirements are met (which all follow from quantum mechanics for the GHZ state):
Ê an even
Ë an odd
Ì an odd
Í an odd
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 for +1 results in “yes”.
Of course, for any given system we can only test one of the requirements Ê to Í.
C. Bell’s theorem
We now consider a pair of spin-1/2 particles in the singlet state 1√
2
(|↑↓〉+ |↓↑〉).
For the singlet state, the probability to get the same result for σ1i and σ
2
j is pi,j = sin
2(θ/2), where θ is
the angle between i and j. Fix three directions a, b, c in the plane with angles of 120◦ between each two.
So pa,b = pa,c = pb,c = 3/4.
We now consider a hidden variable, i.e., a function v that maps σki to v(σ
k
i ) = ±1 for k ∈ {1, 2} and
i ∈ {a, b, c}.
If we assume that the hidden variable is local (and satisfies quantum mechanical predictions), we get
v(σ2i ) = −v(σ1i ). (∗)
Not all three of the numbers v(σ1a), v(σ
1
b) and v(σ
1
c) can be pairwise different. So if (∗) holds, then there
is at least one pair i 6= j (call it “chosen pair”) such that v(σ1i ) 6= v(σ2j ) (an event with quantum mechanical
probability 1/4).
Now we consider a (finite or infinite) sequence of pairs in the singlet state; and assume that the n-th pair
is in some hidden variable state vn. Assume that (∗) holds (for each i ∈ {a, b, c}) with frequency at least
1− . So with frequency ≥ 1−3, (∗) holds for all i simultaneously, and then there is at at least one “chosen
pair”. And as there are just three possible pairs, at least one pair i 6= j has to be chosen with frequency at
least 1/3 within the variables satisfying (∗); i.e., with frequency at least 1/3 −  within all variables. When
we chose  to be 0.04, say, this shows:
Fact 1.3. It is not possible to find a (finite or infinite) sequence of hidden variables5 vn such that the
frequency6 fi,j of
vn(σ
1
i ) = vn(σ
2
j ) (1.4)
is, for all i, j ∈ {a, b, c}, within an error7 of at most 4%, equal to the quantum mechanical predicted
frequencies8 f∗i,j for
σ1i has the same result as σ
2
j . (1.5)
Assuming local hidden variables, (1.4) is the same as (1.5) (for each system in our sequence).
II. PITOWSKY’S MODELS
In a series of articles, Pitowsky tried to analyze whether one could escape Bell’s theorem and get
local models by using non-measurable functions. We investigate the following articles: The first at-
tempt (Pitowsky, 1982a), where he uses the Continuum Hypothesis to construct a “spin-1/2 function” and
a model for the singlet state. This attempt was immediately criticised (Macdonald, 1982; Mermin, 1982).
Starting with his response (1982b), Pitowsky formulated the idea of using a nonstandard notion of prob-
ability, culminating in the so-called Kolmogorovian model (Pitowsky, 1989, Section 5) (in a construction
which does not require the Continuum Hypothesis). This is a universal model that works for all quantum
mechanical systems.
5 Here, vn can be any assignment from the set {σki : k = 1, 2, i = a, b, c} to ±1
6 In case of infinite sequences we might require the frequency (i.e., the limit) to exist.
7 I.e.,
∣∣∣fi,j − f∗i,j∣∣∣ < 0.04.
8 which are 3/4 for i 6= j and 0 for i = j
5A. Pitowsky’s first attempt: The singlet state
To understand Pitowsky’s analysis of Bell’s theorem, let us first give a consequence of this theorem.
Spin 1/2 functions
A “spin 1/2 function” is a function s0 from the sphere S
2 to ±1 satisfying the following:
• s0(−x) = −s0(x).
• Fix x and 0 < θ < pi and set S = {y : y · x = cos(θ)} (a circle equipped with the usual Lebesgue
measure, with total measure 2pi sin(θ)). Then the set S∩{y : s0(y) = s0(x)} is Lebesgue measurable
in S with relative measure cos2(θ/2).
Such a function looks promising for constructing hidden variables for the singlet state: We can define
the “set of hidden variables” to be the orthogonal group O(3), equipped with the normalized Haar measure
θ. We then define for the hidden variable g ∈ O(3) the measurement values g(σ1a) = s0(g(a)) and g(σ2b) =
−s0(g(b)).
If s0 was additionally Lebesgue measurable, then these hidden variables would actually work and violate
Bell’s theorem. So there cannot be a Lebesgue measurable spin 1/2 function.9 However, Pitowsky (1982a)
shows:
Theorem 2.1. Assuming the Continuum Hypothesis, there is a (non measurable) spin-1/2 function.
Pitowsky then claims that the local hidden variables for the singlet state (defined as above), work and
do not suffer from Bell’s theorem.
It is not entirely clear to us from the paper (Pitowsky, 1982a) how he thought that this would actually
work out. Apparently he assumed that by “sabotaging” Bell’s proof (by using non-measurable functions),
and maybe using an intuition similar to the one outlined in footnote 9, the problem would go away.
Criticism
But of course it does not. This was pointed out immediately (Macdonald, 1982; Mermin, 1982):
Let us paraphrase the criticism in concrete terms (we use the notation of Section I.C): Let us fix for
example N = 50 000, and generate N many singlet states. Quantum mechanics tells us that for each pair
i, j from {a, b, c} the frequency of the event “σ1i equals σ2j” will (virtually certainly) be very close to the
calculated probability of 3/4. More concretely, with probability > 1−10−91 (i.e., “always”) the frequency will
be greater than f0 = 3/4−0.04. But Bell’s theorem shows that any sequence of hidden variables, irrespective
of whether they were created by a classical random process, or some nonstandard method either gives a
frequency < f0 for at least one such pair i, j, or gives a frequency of > 0.04 to the (quantum mechanically
outright impossible) event “σ1i equals σ
2
i ” for some i.
9 In more detail: Assume towards a contradiction that s0 is a Lebesgue measurable spin 1/2 function.
We now calculate the probability pi,j for the event g(σ
1
i ) = g(σ
2
j ), i.e., for s0(g(i)) 6= s0(g(j)), i.e. for
the two measurements having different outcome. A “random” choice of g corresponds to first “randomly”
choosing a direction i′ (which is g(i)), and then, again “randomly”, another direction j′ such that i′ and
j′ have the same angle θ as i and j (this j is g(j); note that g preserves angles). The probability that
s0(j
′) = s0(i′) is, by the assumption, cos2(θ/2), so pa,b is sin2(θ/2) as predicted by quantum mechanics.
(Formally, we have to calculate θ(X), the O(3) Haar measure of the set X = {g ∈ O(3) : s0(g(a)) 6=
s0(g(b))}.)
So we can, e.g., pick randomly an infinite (or: sufficiently large) sequence of hidden variables. By the
law of large numbers, with probability one (or: sufficiently large, nonzero is enough) we will get the correct
frequencies (or: frequencies that are sufficiently close), contradicting Bell’s theorem.
6Response, towards the universal model
In response, Pitowsky (1982b) indicated that the objections are based on the “classical” notion of proba-
bility, which has to be modified. We need a new notion of probability (let us call it Pitowsky probability). In
this notion, it can happen that two sets (or: events) A, B have Pitowsky probability one, but the intersection
A ∩B has “classical” probability zero.
Actually, it turns out that the intersection even has to have small Pitowsky probability, as Pitowsky
(1983, p. 164) elaborates: According to his new notion of probability, it is no problem if “90% all of the
objects are red” and “90% all of the objects are small” but “no object is small and red”.10
Note that Pitowsky’s spin 1/2 model features different notions of probability and certainty: By design,
σ1a = −σ2a always holds. Given σ1a = +1, the correct relative frequency for for σ1b = +1 is provided by
classical probability (i.e., Lebesgue measure). However, the absolute frequency for σ1a = +1 cannot be
provided by classical probability (as there is no measurable spin 1/2 function), instead Pitowsky evokes his
new notion of probability.
It turns out that once you agree to use Pitowsky probabilities, and abandon the use of classical Lebesgue
measure for the relative frequencies as well, you get a much simpler model, and furthermore a “universal”
model (called Kolmogorovian model by Pitowsky), that applies not only to the singlet state, but to any
quantum mechanical situation. This is what Pitowsy does in (1989, Sec. 5). The new construction does not
require the Continuum Hypothesis anymore (but Pitowsky uses the Axiom of Choice).
In this sense (also in Pitowsky’s presentation) the Kolmogorovian model replaces the spin 1/2 function
model for the singlet state, so we will concentrate on the Kolmogorovian model in the following.
B. Pitowsky’s universal Kolmogorovian model
In this section, we will present Pitowsky’s (1989, Sec. 5) “universal” Kolmogorovian model. This model
deals with (orthogonal) projection operators only. I.e., instead of predicting which real numbers will be the
result of a measurement, we just predict whether a test will result in “yes”.11
Kolmogorovian models
Let us give us Pitowsky’s definition of a mixture and a Kolmogorovian model right away: Fix a σ-algebra
Σ of (not necessarily Lebesgue measurable) subsets of [0, 1].
• A mixture ρ : Σ → R is a monotone function such that ρ(X) is between the inner and the outer
Lebesgue measure of X.12
• A Kolmogorovian model consists of the following objects, with the following properties:
I [0, 1] is the set of hidden variables. A hidden variable λ ∈ [0, 1] maps each projection A to some
λ(A) ∈ {0, 1} (the result of A when measuring the system in the hidden variable state λ). We
set XA := {λ ∈ Ω : λ(A) = 1}; and require that XA ∈ Σ.
II Given (a specific method to prepare) a quantum mechanical state |Ψ〉, we fix a mixture ρ (which
tells us how the hidden variable states of the state Ψ are distributed; i.e., how likely a specific
variable λ will occur).
10 We will later even see the following form of the effect: “All objects are red” and “all objects are small” but
“no object is small and red”. This form was pointed out by Jozsa (1989, p. 1331), who quite poignantly
described the “paradoxical nonphysical nature” of the model and clarified some misunderstanding sur-
rounding it. We have not found Pitowsky explicitly acknowledging this form, but it is part of his treatment
of the Bell-KS Theorem in (Pitowsky, 1989, 1983).
11 When investigating which kind of hidden variables might exist, the restriction to projections does not
make a substantial difference.
12 Not every X ⊆ [0, 1] is (Lebesgue) measurable (at least assuming the Axiom of Choice); but for every
X there is the inner measure m∗(X) and the outer measure m∗(X) with the following property: m∗(X)
is the maximal measure of any measurable subsets Y∗ of X; and m∗(X) is the minimal measure of any
measurable Y ∗ containing X, i.e., Y ∗ ⊇ X. Of course m∗(X) ≤ m∗(X), and equality holds if and only if
X is measurable (and then the measure of X is m∗(X) = m∗(X)).
If X1 and X2 are disjoint, i.e., X1 ∩X2 = ∅, and X1 has outer measure 1, then X2 has inner measure
0. To see this, note that any Y∗ ⊆ X2 satisfies [0, 1] \ Y∗ ⊇ X1, so if Y∗ had measure  > 0 then [0, 1] \ Y∗
had measure 1−  < 1.
7III If A and B can be measured simultaneously (i.e., they commute), then
ρ(XA ∩XB) + ρ(XA ∪XB) = ρ(XA) + ρ(XB).
IV In a “random sample” of copies of the state |Ψ〉, the relative frequencies of the outcome 1 for
A (i.e., for λ ∈ XA) “approaches” ρ(XA) as the sample grows.
Contrast this definition with the “statistical hidden variables” of Section I.A: Instead of using a “classical”
probability measure, ρ is now just a “mixture”. Also, for a measure the item corresponding to IV is trivially
satisfied (it is just a version of the law of large numbers); while now IV is not even well defined13 (it is not
clear what either “random” or “approaches” actually mean; as we will see later “approaches” cannot mean
that a limit in the usual mathematical sense exists).
Generalized Kolmogorovian models
Instead of directly presenting Pitowsky’s construction of a Kolmogorovian model, we will first give a
simpler (but really equivalent) construction for a modified notion.
Let us first note that it is physically irrelevant to require the hidden variables to be real numbers (as
opposed to, say, vectors in a Hilbert space); and to require that ρ(XA) should have anything to do with
inner or outer Lebesgue measures. Dropping these artificial requirements, we get:
Definition 2.2. Fix an arbitrary set Ω (the set of hidden variables) and Σ, a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω.
• A generalized mixture ρ is a monotone function from Σ to R.
• A generalized Kolmogorovian model is a Kolmogorovian model that uses Ω instead of [0, 1] as
set of hidden variables and a generalized mixture instead of a mixture.14
We can now (without using the Axiom of Choice or non-measurable sets) construct a trivial (and, of
course, physically useless) generalized Kolmogorovian model: We fix a quantum mechanical system with
Hilbertspace H, and a state |Ψ〉.
• We let Ω be the (pure) quantum mechanical states (i.e., elements15 of H with norm 1).
• For a hidden variable λ ∈ Ω and an (orthogonal) projection A (which we identify with its image HA),
we set λ(A) = 1 if λ is eigenvector of A with eigenvalue 1, i.e., if λ ∈ HA. (And we set λ(A) = 0
otherwise.) Accordingly XA = {λ : λ(A) = 1}, which is the set of normalized elements of HA.
• We let Σ be the set of all subsets of Ω.16
• For Y ∈ Σ, let 〈Y 〉 be the H-subspace generated by Y .17
We set ρ(Y ) to be the quantum mechanical probability (using the state |Ψ〉) for the orthogonal
projection to the subspace 〈Y 〉 resulting in +1.
So ρ(XA) is the quantum mechanical probability for A resulting in +1.
It is easy to check that Ω,Σ, ρ forms a generalized Kolmogorovian model:
ρ is a generalized mixture as it is monotone. I and II are obvious. III is satisfied as well: Assume A and
B commute. Then ρ(XA), ρ(XB), ρ(XA ∩XB) and ρ(XA ∪XB) are the quantum-mechanically predicted
vales for a positive outcome of A, B, “A and B”, “A or B”, respectively; and therefore satisfy the equality
in III.18
13 Pitowsky mentions that requirement IV is “not a mathematical theorem, it is merely a consistent claim”
(Pitowsky, 1989, p. 163). We would not even call it a claim, as the notions are undefined.
14 More verbosely, the definition is identical to the definition of Kolmogorovian model, where in Item I we
replace [0, 1] with Ω and in Item II “mixture” with “generalized mixture”.
15 We could instead use one-dimensional subspaces, but that would make the notation slightly less convenient.
16 Or we could let Σ be the σ-algebra generated by the sets XA, it doesn’t matter.
17 In the infinite dimensional case we might want to use “closed subspace” instead of “subspace”.
18 In more detail: Fix an orthonormal basis L of common eigenvectors for A and B. Then L is the
disjoint union of Li for i = A ∩B,A \B,B \A,¬(A∪B), where LA∩B consists of 1-eigenvectors for both
A and B, LA\B consists of vectors that are 1-eigenvectors for A and 0-eigenvectors for B, etc. Then
〈XA ∩ XB〉 = 〈LA∩B〉, and thus ρ(XA ∩ XB) is “the probability for 〈LA∩B〉”, i.e., Σv∈LA∩B |〈Ψ|v〉|2.
Similarly, 〈XA〉 = XA = 〈LA∩B ∪ LA\B〉, so ρ(XA) = Σv∈LA∩B∪LA\B |〈Ψ|v〉|2. Analogously for XB . And
〈XA ∪XB〉 = 〈LA∩B ∪ LA\B ∪ LB\A〉. So ρ(XA ∪XB) = Σv∈LA∩B∪LA\B∪LB\A |〈Ψ|v〉|2.
Remark: Other than XA ∩XB , XA ∪XB is generally not the set of unit vectors of a subspace of H.
8From generalized Kolmogorovian models to regular ones
We now use Ω,Σ, ρ to recover Pitowsky’s construction of a Kolmogorovian model Σ′, ρ′ which satisfies the
original definition (which, as we would like to stress again, has the same physical contents as the generalized
notion). For this, we just add a bit of simple measure theory:
Fist note that the set Ω of states has size continuum. Write the interval [0, 1] as the disjoint union of
continuum many sets (Yi)i∈Ω of outer Lebesgue measure 1. (Here we use the Axiom of Choice.)
We now declare a real r ∈ [0, 1] to be a hidden variable. Such an r is element of exactly one Yλ for λ ∈ Ω;
and we let r produce the same predictions as λ in our generalized Kolmogorovian model r(A) = λ(A).
In particular, X ′A = {r ∈ [0, 1] : r(A) = 1} =
⋃
λ∈XA Yλ will contain some of the “blocks” Yλ completely,
and will omit others completely, more formally:
If r ∈ X ′A and s is in the same block Yλ as r, then s ∈ X ′A. (∗)
So we really just replace a single vector λ ∈ Ω with the block Yλ.
Let Σ′ be the σ-algebra generated by the sets X ′A. Then every element X
′ of Σ satisfies (∗) as well.19 In
particular, whenever X ′ ∈ Σ′ is neither empty nor equal to [0, 1], it has outer measure 1 and inner measure
0 (cf. the end of Footnote 12).
For X ′ ∈ Σ, we set X = {λ ∈ Ω : Yλ ⊆ X ′} and ρ′(X ′) = ρ(X). In particular, ρ′(X ′A) = ρ(XA), which
is the quantum mechanical probability (assuming state |Ψ〉) for A resulting in +1.
Σ′, ρ′ is a Kolmogorovian model:
As ρ is monotone, so is ρ′. We have seen 0 = m∗(X ′) ≤ ρ′(X ′) ≤ m∗(X ′) = 1 for nontrivial X ′ ∈ Σ,
and for the trivial cases note that ρ′(∅) = 0 and ρ′([0, 1]) = 1. So ρ′ is a mixture. I and II are obvious.
For III, it is enough to note that X ′A ∪ X ′B consists of the blocks Yλ that satisfy λ ∈ XA ∪ XB , and so
ρ′(X ′A ∪ X ′B) = ρ(XA ∪ XB). The same holds for ∩ instead of ∪. So the required equation in III for ρ′
follows from the equation for ρ.
A simple example
Already a very simple example shows the strange nature of Pitowsky’s model:20
Let us look at a pair of spin-1/2 particles in the singlet state. We use the “generalized” notation (a hidden
variable is a state φ in the four dimensional Hilbert space), which can trivially be translated into Pitowsky’s
original notation (then the hidden variable is a real r that gets mapped to φ).
The hidden variable φ will result in σ1a = +1 if and only if φ = |a〉 ⊗ v for some v ∈ H2 (the two-
dimensional space of the second particle); and will result in σ2a = +1 if and only if φ = v ⊗ |a〉 for some
v ∈ H1.
Measuring σ1a will not interfere with the σ
2
a hidden-variable measurement, as the hidden variable model
is local.21
Let us denote with Xa the set of hidden variables that have the form either v ⊗ |a〉 or |a〉 ⊗ v. As
we can perform both (spatially separated) measurements, and as the Pitowsky-probabilities correspond
to the quantum mechanically predicted probabilities, we know that Xa has Pitowsky-probability 1 (i.e.,
ρ(Xa) = 1).
So for three different directions a, b and c the sets Xa ∩Xb have at most two elements while
Xa ∩Xb ∩Xc is empty. (2.3)
(Really empty, not just of probability 0.)
So, to paraphrase Pitowsky: All balls are red, and all balls are small, and all balls are heavy, but no
ball is small and red and heavy.
While this effect is most obvious in the Kolmogorovian model, similar effects apply to the earlier model
for the singlet state22 due to Bell’s theorem, as described in sections Criticism and Response on page 5 and
also in (Jozsa, 1989, p. 1331), see also (Czachor, 1992).
19 Σ could be defined as closure under arbitrary unions instead of just countable ones, or even as the set of all
subsets of [0, 1]. In the latter case we just have to redefine ρ′(X ′) as min (m∗(X ′),max (m∗(X ′), ρ(X))).
20 An even simpler example for the same effect uses just a single spin-1/2 particle; where we have to use
non-contextuality instead of locality.
21 As explicitly claimed by Pitowsky (1989, (b) on p. 169).
22 This specific example however does not work there, as σ1a = −σ2a always holds.
9III. ANALYSIS OF THE KOLMOGOROVIAN MODEL
A. Kolmogorovian models are superdeterministic
The weirdness of quantum mechanics
To work with another example,23 let us move from the singlet state to the GHZ state. According to
Fact 1.2, quantum physics implies that each of Ê–Í is satisfied, and that this cannot be done by fixing
hidden parameter values ±1 for the six σia (for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and a ∈ {x, y}).
So all deterministic hidden variables theories have to be “weird” in some way or the other. They have
to suffer from one of the following:
(a) Nonlocality. As mentioned, there are such non-local hidden variable models.
(b) Super-determinism. As mentioned, physically doubly irrelevant: Firstly super-determinism is physi-
cally unfeasible, secondly hidden variables are pointless within super-determinism.
(c) Non-classical logic. One could maybe claim that Ê–Í can hold simultaneously for suitable “yes/no”
values, if we completely change our basic understanding of logic and reasoning. We will ignore such
positions here.
Pitowsky’s probability
Pitowsky however claims to have found another way: supposedly one can move all the weirdness into
his nonstandard notion of statistics (Pitowsky probability). He explicitly claims (Pitowsky, 1989, p. 169)
that his model is local (even non-contextual) and classical, i.e., does not suffer weirdness (a) or (c). We will
argue in the following that Pitowsky’s model is in fact just super-deterministic.
Let A1 be the set of hidden Kolmogorovian variables satisfying Ê. As quantum mechanics implies
Ê, ρ(A1) = 1. In other words, the Pitowsky probability for a hidden variable to be in the set A1 is
1. Analogously define A2, A3 and A4. So Ai all are Pitowsky measure 1 sets; while the intersection⋂
i=1,...,4Ai = ∅ is empty.
For Pitowsky, this is a peculiar property of his notion of probability: Ê is satisfied with measure 1 (i.e.,
always) as Ai has measure 1; the same holds for Ë etc. It is true that no hidden variable can have all
properties Ê–Í, but if we measure property Ê on some sequence, then Ê will be satisfied; and Ë has to be
measured on another sequence so consistently we can assume that on this sequence Ë is satisfied, etc.
While Pitowsky claims that this can be seen as an effect of a non-classical notion of probability, it really
is just a variant of super-determinism. This can be seen most clearly if we just consider a single state
three-particle system, which we first assume to have hidden variable v. We know that v determines the six
values used in the requirements Ê–Í, and therefore we know that at least one of the requirements fail. Let
us assume that Ê fails. In other words: If we test Ê, we will get a contradiction to quantum mechanics.
However, Ê will hold with Pitowsky probability 1, i.e., always. So in the Pitowsky model, we will not
measure Ê, i.e., our hidden variable excludes certain measurements, i.e., is super-deterministic.
Isn’t a single system unrealistic?
One could object to the use of a single three-particle system: In real world experiments, one has to
deal with non-perfect measurements etc., and a violation of quantum mechanic predictions in a single event
would just be considered an outlier and ignored, quite consistently with experimental data.
Of course, this argument does not help: Assume that we first create a sequence of a million hidden
variables. Each of the variables will violate at least one of the requirements Ê–Í; so at least one requirement
23 Pitowsky (1989) does not mention the GHZ Theorem, which was not yet known. However, he mentions
(and claims that his model deals with) the Bell-Kochen-Specker Theorem (Bell, 1964; Kochen and Specker,
1967), which is very similar to GHZ but requires not just locality, but non-contextuality of the hidden
variables (which holds in the Kolmogorovian model).
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has to be violated in at least 25% of the variables. Again, assume that is the case for Ê. If the Pitowsky
setup were non super-deterministic, we could now choose to test Ê on the sequence, and get a success rate
of at most 75% (instead of the 100% predicted by quantum mechanics); which is definitely not in line with
real life experiments.
Two remarks:
• If each time we choose the one forbidden setting, we of course even get 100% failure. But it seems
hard to argue that we could guess a long sequence of forbidden settings correctly.
• The argument relies on locality only; it is not required that the choice of a measurement at position
1, say, will not affect the outcomes for subsequent measurements at the same position 1. (However,
in Pitowsky’s Model the outcome is in fact independent). So we generally have to assume that the
result for, e.g., the n-th measurement of σ1x also depends on the measurement setting (x, y or z) of
all the previous n− 1 many measurements at position 1 (and the measurement results, but they are
determined anyway). This does not change the argument: Using only locality, we can still argue that
the hidden variables will give for given n, i, and a the same results for testing σia on the n-th particle
for both appearances in the equations Ê–Í.
The singlet state
In the GHZ case, we have seen that at least one out of four measurement combinations will be ruled out
by the hidden variable. In the singlet state, super-deterministic nature of the Kolmogorovian model is even
more dramatic.
Let us first create a hidden variable state. Using the notation of (2.3), this state can be in Xb (the
states that are “OK” for b) for at most two directions, b1 and b2, say. So whenever we afterwards chose to
measure σ1c and σ
2
c for any direction c other than b1 and b2, we get “not +1” both times, in a violation of
quantum mechanics.
So if we have a device that can measure spins in ` many directions, and if we use two of these devices,
spatially separated, and make sure both will measure the same direction,24 then for any given hidden variable
state, at least `− 2 out of the ` possible measurements will violate quantum mechanics.
B. From super-determinism to the Kolmogorovian model, Pitowsky’s law of large numbers
We have argued that Kolmogorovian models imply a form of super-determinism.
In turn, from a super-deterministic point of view, we can easily see how the Kolmogorovian model
works. This will also shed light on how to interpret the notions in assumption IV of the definition of the
Kolmogorovian model:
“In a random sample of particles, whose statistical state is given by the mixture ρ, the frequency
of particles having property A approaches ρ(A) as the sample grows.” (Pitowsky, 1989, p. 163)
Recall that ρ(A) is just the quantum mechanical probability for A.
So let us assume a super-deterministic position. We know (since we know all) that we will investigate
a sequence of m many systems (in state |Ψ〉), and that for each copy of the system we will measure the
sequence A1, A2, . . . , An of commuting
25 projections. We know that the j-th system will give the results
aj1, . . . , a
j
n. If m is large enough, then (with high probability) the a
j
i will appear with frequencies close to the
quantum mechanically predicted sequences. For each j, there is a state φj which is simultaneous eigenvalue
of Ai with eigenvalue a
j
i . This is the j-th hidden variable we chose.
So in this construction, where we start from super-determinism, the notions in assumption IV are the
following: “random” means according to our prescience (i.e., quite determined and not random at all).
24 E.g., both devices look at the same distant star and use photons arriving from there to determines the
direction in a previously agreed way.
25 As mentioned, whenever we measure a non-commuting observable, we will have to change any hidden
parameter.
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“Approaches” means the usual limit, but only for those A that are actually measured. (Other observables
A will feature frequencies entirely different from ρ(A).)26
In this sense, Pitowsky’s model is logically consistent (just as super-determinism is). Of course, this is
not particularly satisfying; but as we have argued over and over, we cannot do better.
Let us argue the same thing once again, from a slightly different point of view:
Classically, we have the following (which can be seen as a simple form of the law of large numbers):
Fix finitely (or countably) many Lebesgue measurable sets Ai ⊆ [0, 1] of measure ai. Generate
a random27 sequence (rn)n∈N of elements of [0, 1]. Then with probability 1, the frequency of
rn ∈ Ai is ai for all i.28
Pitowsky observes that he cannot prove a similar law for his notion of probability; and replaces it with
Principle IV in his definition of Kolmogorovian models, quoted above.
It is true that a “proper” Pitowsky law of large numbers would be sufficient to give a realistic, local,
non-super-deterministic hidden variable theory; but such speculation is vacuous as it is easy to see that the
“proper” law fails for Pitowsky probability. Let us again use the GHZ notation:
Fix sets Ai ⊂ [0, 1] (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) such that
⋂
Ai = ∅. They do not have to be Lebesgue
measurable (but we will assume they are “Pitowsky measurable” and all have “Pitowsky
measure” 1). Generate (by whatever process you like, e.g., a Pitowsky random process) an
infinite sequence (rn)n∈N of elements of [0, 1]. Then for at least one i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the
frequency of the property rn ∈ Ai is not 1.
Actually, if all frequencies exist29 then for at least one i the frequency is ≤ 0.75.
The proof is entirely trivial: Fix any sequence rn, and assume that all frequencies are defined and bigger
than 0.75. I.e., for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} there is a Ni such that for all n ≥ Ni the Ai-frequency of the finite
sequence r1, . . . , rn is bigger than 0.75. Let n be max(N1, N2, N3, N4). Then the finite sequence up to N
has frequency bigger than 0.75 for all i, a contradiction of the fact that
⋂
Ai = ∅.
Note that our observations in this section do not contradict anything Pitowsky says directly. Rather,
Pitowsky argues that we measure the different Ai on different samples, and that on each sample we will get
the correct frequency for the according measurement. (As already mentioned, this is logically consistent, as
it just means that we are dealing with super-determinism.)
C. Set theory and physics
There has been some debate over the following question:
Could the choice of set theoretic axioms have any effect on the physical theories? Or, from a
different perspective: could physical knowledge imply that specific set theoretic axioms should
be preferred over others?
Of course we know that, e.g., the Axiom of Choice is required for many mathematical theorems (such as:
every vector space has a basis), which in turn can be applied in physics. However, on closer inspection it
turns out that for all concrete instances that are used, the axiom of choice is not required. The same applies
even for the existence of an infinite set: One can use a very constructive, “finitary” form of mathematics
that is perfectly sufficient for physics. (It is a different question whether it is equally practical and intuitive
as the “usual” mathematics based on set theory.)
26 We could also choose the following alternative (but this is not what happens in the Kolmogorovian model):
We could, from the pre-determined sequence of hidden variables, define ρ(A) to be the frequency for A as
determined by the hidden variables. In that case, “approaches” will be the limit for all A, but the value
of ρ(A) will differ from quantum mechanical predictions (in those observables A that are not actually
measured.
27 Using the “standard” notion of probability: We use independent and identically distributed random
variables, each using the uniform distribution. In other words, we use the product measure of countably
many copies of the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1].
28 I.e., limn→∞
|{1≤m≤n: rm∈Ai}|
n exists and is equal to ai.
29 I.e., if fi := limn→∞
|{1≤m≤n: rm∈Ai}|
n is defined
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Pitowsky used the Continuum Hypothesis to construct a spin-1/2-function model. Pitowsky suggested
that the existence of such a function might not follow from the usual axioms of set theory alone, which has
recently been confirmed by Farah and Magidor (2012). In the same paper, as well as in (Magidor, 2012), it
has been argued that the spin-1/2 model is an indication that physical considerations might provide input
on which new axioms should be adopted for set theory.
We do not share this opinion:
• Pitowsky’s spin-1/2-function is introduced just to “sabotage” a specific argument in one of the possible
proofs of Bell’s theorem: Using a non-measurable function prevents proofs using the expected value
of the function. Accordingly, the spin-1/2-function alone does not give any model; the real point of
the matter is the dramatically altered basic notion of probability which has to be added on top of it
(let us call it Pitowsky probability).
• Once you adopt Pitowsky probability, the spin-1/2-function becomes unnecessary: It is easy to give a
universal model for all quantum mechanical systems (the Kolmogorovian model). Pitowsky uses the
Axiom of Choice for this model, but we think even that is unnecessary30, as argued in the section on
generalized Kolmogorovian models in Section II.B.
• But in the end, Pitowsky probability turns out to be just a variant of super-determinism. Accordingly,
the models are obviously consistent, but physically not relevant. (And doubly so: super-determinism
is physically unfeasible, and hidden variables are pointless within super-determinism.)
So we come to quite the opposite conclusion as Farah and Magidor: Instead of indicating connections
between physics and set theory, Pitowsky’s attempts of hidden variables rather seems to reaffirm the old
intuition: “if nontrivial set theory, non-constructive mathematics or a non-measurable set is used in an
essential way, it cannot be physically relevant”.
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